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In the

Supreme Com1 of the State of Utah
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Plaintiff and Respondent,
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Case No.
721'5
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Defendant and Appellant.
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In the

Supreme Court· of the State of Utah
STATE OF UTAH,
Pla.intiff and Respondent,

Case No.

vs.

7215

WILLIE DIXON,
Defendant and

~ppellant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The State agrees with appellant's statement of facts
except:
1. There is no evidence in the record of any discrepancy in the testimony of the witnesses at the trial and at
the preliminary hearing;

2. That the witness Vernell Stewart was five years
of age on February 1, 1948 (the day the offense was comSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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mitted) and would be six years of age in May, 1948 (Tr.
P. 8). The trial was held April13, 1948;
3. 'The boy, Vernell Stewart, testified on both direct
and cross examination of the commission of the crime (Tr.
P. 12 and 20).
ARGUMENT

Appellant's argument for reversal is based upon two
contentions. One, that the witness, Vernell Stewart, because of his tender years should not have been permitted
to testify; and, second, there is insufficient evidence of any
penetration to constitute the crime of sodomy. We will
dispell the arguments seriatum.

:a1'

:::fi,

I.
The Court properly permitted Vernell Stewart
to testify.

·~~!

Section 104-49-2·(2) U. C. A., 1943, provides:

"The following persons cannot be witnesses:
(1) Those who are of unsound mind at the .~tk
time of their production for examination.
1t!
(2) Children under ten years of age, who appear incapable of receiving just impressions of the
facts respecting which they are examined, or of ~i 1
relating them truly.
11
(3) A party to any civil action, suit or proceeding, and any person directly interested in the ~
event thereof, and any person from, through or ~·,~.
under whom such party or interested person derives ,1
his interest or title or any part thereof, when the 11
adverse party in such action, suit or proceeding ~
G

I

1
•

1
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claims or opposes, sues or defends, as guardian of
an insane or incompetent person, or as the executor
or administrator, heir, legatee or devisee of any deceased person, or as guardian, assignee or grantee,
directly or remotely, of such heir, legatee or devisee,
as to any statement by, or transaction with, such
deceased, insane or incompetent person, or matter
of fact whatever, which must have been equally
within the knowledge of both the witness and such
insane, incompetent or deceased person, unless such
witness is called to testify thereto by such adverse
party so claiming or opposing, suing or defending,
in such action, suit or proceeding."
The witness was a boy three months short of six years
of age, at the time of crime. At the trial he was examined
by the attorney for the State, for the defense and by Court.
In such examination, the witness testified that he knew
what telling a lie was, and that if he told a lie he would be
"put in jail," that he knew what to tell the truth was, and
that he would tell the truth (Tr. P. 5 & 6) .
As to his capability of receiving correct impressions
and relating them, the Court asked his age, the color of his
shirt and pants, the name of his father and mother, whether
he knew whether he would be a good or bad boy if he told
the truth (Tr. P. 8 & 9).
Since State vs. Blyth, 20 Utah 378, the rule in this ·state,
as in other states, has been that where a child is under the
age of ten, the test is whether the child is capable of receiving just impressions of facts or of stating them truly~ State
vs. Morasco, 42 Utah 5, 128 P. 5·71; State vs. MacMillan,
46 Utah 19; State vs. Z eezich, 61 Utah 61, 210 Pac. 927;
State vs. Williams, 180 Pac. (2) 551.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

4

In this jurisdiction, as stated in the above cited cases,
and as counsel for appellant concedes, the question of competency of the witness is for trial judge who has the opportunity to ob~erve and question the witness. His conclusion as to the competency will not be reversed unless there
has been an abuse of the judicial discretion vested in him as
trial judge.
Counsel for the State is impressed with the similarity of
the case at bar with the case. of State vs. Morasco, supra.
In that case, the witness was between five and six years
of age. The questions propounded to that witness and the
answers are remarkably similar to the questions and answers
in this case. (See P. 7 of 42 Utah.) The Court in that case
held that the witness was competent; in that case, also, the
Court gave a cautionary instruction, referred to by the
Court at page 9 of 42 Utah. Instruction No.5 in the instant
case is a cautionary instruction given to the jury by the trial
judge.
We submit that under the authorities and the facts in
this case, the Court did not abuse its discretion in permitting
Vernell Stewart to testify.
;

II.
The evidence supports the coJ!clusion that there was
penetration sufficient to prove the crime of sodomy.
As in the crime of rape, any penetration, howev·er slight,
is sufficient to sustain a conviction. Weaver vs. Territory,
127 P. 724 (Ariz.).
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In the case at bar, Vernell Stewart both on direct examination and on cross examination testified that at the
instigation of the defendant, he "sucked it a little." At Page
12 of the Transcript:
"Q. What happened after he asked you to suck
his pee pee?
"A. The kids come here, and he ·holded the
door shut so I couldn't get out, and the kids trying to
push the door open. And -so they opened the door.
And they went in the bathroom, and he took me
around the corner, and made me pee pee. He wanted
me suck his pee pee a little and I sucked it a little.

"Mr. Shields: I didn't get that last statement.
"The Court: He said 'I sucked a little.'
"A.

And I went back into the free show.

"Q.

Vernell, what did you suck?
His pee pee.

"A.

"Q. . How were you-were you standing up, ·
sitting down, or what were you doing when you were
doing that?
"A. Standing up.
"Q. Did he say anything to you when you were
doing that?
"A. Unh-uh.
"Q.

"A.

Did you see his pee pee?
(Witness nodded head in the affirmative.)

"A.

Do you have a pee pee yourself?
(Witness nodded head in the affirmative.)

"Q.

Where is it? Could you point to it, where

"Q.

it is?
"A.

Right here (indicating).
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"Mr. Johnson: May the record show he is pointing to his privates?
"The Court: The record may so show."
On cross examination, counsel unsuccessfully endeavored to have the witness contradict his testimony, (P. 16 &
17 of Tran~cript) but received again the statement of penetration ('Tr. P .. 20) :
"Q.

Then what happened, and will you tell us

where?
"A.
a dime.

Then he wanted me suck my pee pee for

~~

:tn1

:m

~ir

"Q. Where did he go-come over here where
you were?
"A. Yes.

So he wasn't holding the door, was he?.
"A. No, not then. When we got through of it,
then he hold the door.
"Q.

"Q.

"A.
door.

What?
When I suck his pee pee, then he shut the

"Q. That is after you did it, then he went back
and held the door; is that it?
"A. Yes.
"Q. How did he hold the door? Did he stand
against it, or put his hand against it?
"A. Standed against it."

Thus we have the direct evidence of the act itself,
corroborated and sustained by the testimony of the three
witnesses, Webb, Smith and Harris, who though not seeing
the act, placed the defendant on the scene at the time of the
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offense. Further, though not alarmed, as counsel for defendant says, nevertheless, they testified to circumstances
corroborating the com~ission of the act; to wit, the blocked
door to the lavatory (Tr. P. 33, 40, 49, 54, 64, 65, 70), with
the defendant and Vernell Stewart inside; the boy, Vernell,
spitting and wiping his mouth (Tr. P. 35, 52, 60 & 66).
In conclusion, we quote from State vs. M orasco, supra,
page 13 and 14:
"We think the evidence amply justifies the verdict.
"The contention that the discrepancy in the
boy's testimony renders it unworthy of belief is untenable. The discrepancy, in so far as it relates to
the facts and circumstances immediately connected
with and surrounding the commission of the crime
charged, is more apparent than real. The persistency
with which counsel for defendant objected to practically every question asked the boy on his direct examination and the prolonged, searching, and rigor-.
ous cross-examination to which the child was subjected might well have confused and bewildered a
much older and more experienced person. There is
not a circumstance or incident of the trial referred
to in the record that even suggests that the boy was
in any sense a designing witness or that he had been
coached or instructed as to what his testimony should
be. His answers were frank and artless, and showed
entire candor on his part. His testimony showed
that he did not have the slightest conception of the
revolting character of the assault. In fact, his tender
age precludes any inference that he knew or should
have known that the defendant's conduct, as he related it, was anything more than a mere impropriety.
Therefore his testimony that he entertained no ill
feelings toward the defendant, but that he "liked"
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him, does not necessarily weaken or neutralize the
effect of his evidence wherein he describes the defendant's conduct-what he did in making the alleged assault.
"The court, as we have pointed out, instructed
the jury that they should, because of the boy's tender
years, examine his testimony with care and caution.
Thus the defendant's rights in this regard were fully
protected."
We submit the verdict· should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,

GROVER A. GILES,
Attorney General
HERBERT F. SMART,
Assistant Attorney General
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